

Augustine's Self-Knowledge in Animals

Karel Klozar

*Faculty of Theology
University of South Bohemia
Kněžská 8, 370 01 České Budějovice
koze@seznam.cz*

This paper focuses on Augustine's concept of self-knowledge or self-awareness in non-rational animals through examining the relation between external senses, internal sense and rationality. The explanation of what causes motion in non-rational living beings is quite puzzling in the case of animal's self-perception – for what reason do they move, sense or live. This motivation is also connected to the self-preservation principle, which is one of the two sources of confusion regarding self-perception in animals; the other one is the ability of internal sense or anima to perceive themselves, other animals and humans as alive – in spite of the fact that this can in no way be sensory information.

Key words: Augustine, self-knowledge, self-perception, self-sensing, internal sense, rationality, wisdom and numbers

Soul and it's powers

Animals can perceive themselves, other animals and humans as living by some sort of natural agreement. They are aware of difference between “their life” and “everything else” but for this, animals do not need to perceive themselves as the subject of their activities. I believe it is plausible to read Augustine's texts, that life is a *sui generis* category and has some species-based tools which give it powers to use – the power to perceive with the external senses; of sensing with internal sense; of thinking with rationality; and of self-seeing which is provided by immateriality of soul.

There is a plausible explanation for different statements Augustin made in DLA¹ and DT² about self sensing in animals: *anima* is a sort of life, which is always the same – in plants, animals and humans. This life has one axiomatic property: it senses itself as alive and it wants to keep sensing this state of affairs. Therefore, it triggers activities (nutrition, growth, passion, inclination, love, will, movement) to maintain this state, which is sort of unity. In animals it is bodily integrity, in rational humans it is unity with the will of the Creator. In both cases it is a sort of self-preservation – of body and of spirit. The difference between kinds of life (God, human, animal, plant) is in the tools it has at its disposal.

Three aristotelian souls and God

Augustine was aware of the Aristotelian approach to kinds of life – vegetative, sensitive and rational, but it seems that he did not agree with this approach. All these kinds of life are united by God, who senses and perceives everything in his mind (*mens*), because He is a spirit without a body, *sentio* and *intellego* are the same thing in His case. The power of God's mind is not bound by any (corporeal) tools.

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- 1 DLA 3.23.66.225 = De libero arbitrio, book 3. Quoted English translation: Augustine: "On the Free Choice of the Will." In *On the Free Choice of the Will, on Grace and Free Choice, and Other Writings*. Edited and translated by P. King, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, pp. 3–126; Latin version, which is inserted in brackets: Augustine: "De libero arbitrio." In *Sant' Agostino. Augustinus Hipponensis* [online] [cit. 20. 2. 2019]. Available at: https://www.augustinus.it/latino/libero_arbitrio/index2.htm. In author's original text can be added additional information, latin word for example, always in (round brackets), whereas in quotation of Augustine's translated text is always added note in [square brackets]. In some quotation can be added italics, which is always marked in corresponding note. The same stands for work with De Trinitate – see following note.
 - 2 DT VIII 9 = De trinitate, Book VIII, Paragraph 9. English translations of DT (quotation numbering from these books, I skipped the "pergamem" number, therefore there is only Book number (VIII–XV) and paragraph number. I compared two English translations together with Augustine's Latin, specially in crucial or unclear places. Resulting English quotations and added Latin in [square brackets] came from these three sources: Augustine: *The Trinity*. Introduction, translation and notes E. Hill, ed. J. E. Rotelle. Augustinian Heritage Institute. New City Press, New York, 2015; Augustine: *On the Trinity, Books 8–15*. Edited by G. B. Matthews, translated by S. McKenna, Cambridge University Press, (Virtual Publishing) 2003; and latin: Augustine: "De trinitate." In *Sant' Agostino. Augustinus Hipponensis* [online] [cit. 20. 2. 2019]. Available at: <https://www.augustinus.it/latino/trinita/index2.htm>. Both English translations are insufficiently discriminating latin nosco, scio and intellego.

“Let us first of all, therefore, reduce these many things to a small number. For what is called ‘life’ [vita] in God is itself His essence and nature. God, then, does not live except by the life which He Himself is to Himself. But this life is not such as is within a *tree*, where there is no understanding [intellectus] and no sensation [sensus]. Nor is it such as is in a *beast*, for the life of a beast has the five-fold sense, but it has no understanding [intellectum]; but that life which God is, perceives [sentio] and understands [intellego] all things, and it perceives in a *mind* [mens], not in a body [corpus], because God is spirit [cf. John 4:24]. But not as animals which have bodies does God perceive [sentio] through a body, for He does not consist of soul [anima] and body, and, therefore, that simple nature, as it understands [intellego], so it perceives [sentio], as it perceives [sentio], so it understands [intellego; sicut intellegit sentit, sicut sentit intellegit] and in it perception [sensus] is the same as understanding [intellectus]. Nor is this nature such that at one time it should either cease to be, or begin to be, for it is immortal. Not without reason has it been said of Him that He alone has immortality [cf. 1 Timothy 6:16]; for His immortality is true immortality, in whose nature there is no change.”³

Bodily things exist, are not alive and not rational. Movement of bodies, like stones falling downward, is a natural movement which belongs to the stones.⁴

“Every thing among those that feel neither pain nor pleasure acquires loveliness of its kind, or at least a sort of stability for its nature, from some unity.”⁵

3 DT XV 7.

4 See DLA 3.1.2.6–7.

5 DLA 3.23.70.237.

Plants are bodies enlivened with a sort of life which has no organs to sense with, therefore life in plants can not establish any relation to surroundings and therefore can only accept nourishment, grow and reproduce.

“We recognize that we share many common characteristics not only with animals but with trees and plants too. We see that taking bodily nutrition, growing, reproducing, and flourishing are also attributes of trees, and are contained in a *lower level of life* [*quae infima quadam vita continentur*]. We also note that wild animals are able to see, hear, and sense material objects by smell or taste or touch.”⁶

Animals have sense organs and limbs and this allows them to establish more complex relations with surroundings in order to keep the sensation of itself as alive. Animals *do not need* rationality for this, because God created everything for some purpose and gave it means necessary for it. Today we would call it instinct, Augustine calls it habit, inclination, love (*amor*), desire (*cupiditas*), or passion (*libido*). Humans have sense organs like animals, but their anima is equipped with extra power, Augustine calls it the “head or eye of the soul”⁷ which is intelligence or rationality; it has two main features: *scientia*, which is responsible for knowing through thinking; (*cogito*), which consists in uttering mental words (*verbum*); and *sapientia*, which is sort of a rational mind’s spiritual sense organ which sees (*intueor*) or knows (*nosco*) higher, unchangeable and everlasting goods or norms – and itself. This rational eye of anima makes humans an image of God and therefore it makes goal of human life different from animals.

In case of anima, which has no rationality, and therefore no power to form abstract concepts or mental words through which it could grasp its content, we can not speak of something like self-awareness in a strong sense. Anima functions on the basis of automatic and reflexive responses – on *numbers*, which it performs through its internal sense and through senses and the physical body. An animal does not *need* to be aware of it-

6 DLA 1.8.18.61.

7 DLA 2.6.13.53, DT XV 11.

self as a subject of its own activities, an animal only senses its activity but not activity as its own; and, Augustin is very specific about it, anima adds one abstract category of “being alive” to sensed data. Bodily senses do not sense life as such, but bodily objects only – such as color, size, shape, speed, sound, but there is no category of immaterial life in such sensations. Anima has no rationality to infer that “this moving object” is alive, so Augustine claims that this “notion” is added by some natural agreement.⁸

Dream example

When a dreamer is not aware that he is dreaming, we can not say that this dreamer is not self-aware, but it is clear he has no chance to act freely, instead he is simply reacting to dream situations by motions triggered by fear, love or habit, but this happens automatically, instinctively. But a dreamer can “wake up” in the dream by realizing that “this is just a dream” and in that very moment the dream becomes lucid. The dreamer now realizes he is the subject of the activities, can deliberately perform any action and is aware of the consequences. This “waking up” is like adding rationality to anima. This adding of rationality brings about one thing: the mind (*mens*).

Two possible self-perception readings in animals

Animals have an evident instinct of self-preservation; avoid harm; seek physical pleasure; and have power by which to avoid fragmentation of the body. None of these would be possible without some sort of self-sensing: their internal sense senses sense organs, senses itself sensing sense organs (senses itself through activity) and also must sense itself (has some notion of itself directly – but only in terms of “being alive” and striving to “keep this state of sensing”). Animals do not have reason, therefore they do not think (*cogito*) and understand (*scio*), therefore their self-perception can not be based on abstract concepts which are accessible by rationality only. Animals just perceive or sense (*sentio*); and therefore self-perceive or self-sense only.

⁸ See DT VIII 9.

This self-perception in animals can be understood in two ways. In a stronger sense, an animal's self-perception consists of not only perceiving "what is going on" but also having some clue about themselves as *agents* or *subjects* of their activities. This reading seems to be mostly supported by the evident self-preservation in animals, but not by direct textual evidence in DLA and DT.

Toivanen⁹ claims he found four keypoints of Seneca's Letter 121 in Augustine's DLA and from that he argued for this stronger sense. Toivanen mostly argues with Augustine's DLA, which he wrote before DT (in closing the DLA, Augustine even announces an upcoming book, where he has to deal with questions which remained unsolved in DLA, mainly the "trinity" issue).¹⁰ Toivanen identifies these four claims in Augustine's DLA, and are contained in Seneca's Letter 121 which are: (1) The ability of animals to use their bodies appropriately. It shows, that they are able not only to perceive their own bodies, but also to know the respective body part's functions... According to Augustine, this can occur due to the numbers¹¹, as we show later in the text in the "source of motion" chapter. (2) Animals perceive themselves as living beings and subjects of their own activities. – Here, the first half is correct due to DT VIII 9, but the second half is not. An animal senses itself as alive, but not as the subject of it's own activities. (3) Self-perception must also be attributed to animals, because without a complex cognitive system, which provides them information about their own bodies, they would lack the necessary means for self-preservation; animals would not strive to avoid harm, suffering and death, if they did not perceive themselves as living beings. – This is a correct argument, animals do perceive themselves as living, but this is due to some natural agreement, not by some reflexivity principle. (4) Animals' ability to avoid harmful things and seek useful things is based on their self-perception... Here we have to add, that according to Augustine, self-perception is the first and necessary condition, but then internal sense acts according to numbers imputed in their anima by the Creator, as we will show.

9 See Toivanen (2013, pp. 355–382).

10 See DLA 3.21.60.205–9.

11 Numbers and wisdom will be explained in chapter Wisdom and Numbers.

From discovering these four “same” principles in Seneca and Augustine, Toivanen concluded that Augustine’s view about self-perception in animals is basically the same as Seneca’s. However, this might not be correct because in DT from book XII on, Augustine updated his view a little regarding self-perception and self-awareness to something more rational-based: permanent unarticulated (*nosco*) and also thinking-based (*scio*). Here we have to note that Augustine deals with this topics mostly in De Trinitate, which he had been writing for almost 20 years and in Book XII he took a break for several years. The kind of self-knowledge he emphasized in the first part, before his break, was a little stoic – some sort of unbounded permanent self-awareness. Nevertheless, during Book XII, his approach to self-knowledge changed from this permanent style to something more temporal, based on rational thinking, on rational reflection. More precisely, he divided self-awareness to permanent divine-like (*nosco*) and temporal rational-like (*scio*). It is clearly visible when checking the usage of the verb *nosco* before Book XII and after. It does not seem to me that Augustine rejected his previous ideas, he just did not put such a strong emphasis on them and further developed his thinking-based self-approach. From Book XIII on, he started to develop an idea of a different kind of self-knowledge. Furthermore, we must not forget that stoics were within materialists, their soul, even the souls of gods, were made of elements (earth, water, fire and air), whereas Augustine strictly refused any kind of materialism regarding the rational soul.¹²

Weaker sense animals can sense “what is going on” within them, but have no idea of themselves as being the agent or subject of their own activities – they just act on instincts. They have no “tool” (rationality) to perform such an operation or seeing. This implies, that they have no control over their reactions and activities, like us in a dream. There is no self-conscious “subject” judging and making decisions deliberately, and who would be aware of himself doing so.

Silva claims that “sensory self-awareness in non-rational beings must be understood in the restricted sense of awareness of the state of their

¹² See Cary (2000, pp. 55, 10–11).

sense organs”,¹³ and that “At a basic level of information processing, Augustine seems to have no use for self-awareness, except for the awareness of the state of one’s own sense organs. Only when reason intervenes in the process does the soul become aware of itself, which means that non-human animals are excluded from self-awareness in this stronger sense.”¹⁴ This weaker sense is better supported by textual evidence, but we have to add one extra abstract concept to it – “life” which is added to perceived (*sentio*) sensual information by a sort of natural inclination. But there is only this one, nothing more – and this is the key point which might confuse some readers – what the possible implications of the statement are, that anima can sense itself as being alive, as well as other animals and humans. Animals can not think (*cogito, scio*) because they have no reason. It means they can only form two kinds of trinities, where one trinity consists of sensual information (sensory data + internal sense + love) and the other in recalling these images from memory (image of external thing recalled from memory + internal sense + love). And this inability to think brings strict restrictions to what and how can anima, through internal sense, “does” with the contents it “gets” from senses or sense memory.

Therefore, there are two main readings of an animal’s self-perception: weak and strong. In the following text I try to prove, in detail, that the weak is supported by textual evidence, but it must be “enriched” by the category of “life as such”, which makes it a little bit stronger, but not in the sense of adding some sort of reflexivity or self-consciousness.

In the following text, I will also distinguish between *mens*, *animus* and *anima*. *Mens* knows (*nosco*), *animus* knows (*scio*), *anima* senses (*sentio*). Augustine is clearly distinguishing these three and even uses this distinction to prove something else. Therefore we always need to know who is performing the operation, by what means, and who is looking at it. Knowledge belongs to mind, internal sense to soul or internal sense, sense-perception to body.¹⁵

13 Silva (2016, p. 157).

14 Silva (2016, p. 177).

15 See O’Daly (1987, p. 105).

External senses

External senses exist; they are not alive but enlivened by the soul; and not understanding. They judge the “taste” of sensory touch, whether it is too strong or too weak, in order to gain gentle touch. They are in no way aware of their own activity, so their activity depends on internal sense’s guidance. Some senses have their private object, some senses share it (sight, touch – shape, size). This is not discriminated by these senses themselves, but by internal sense or rationality.¹⁶

There must be activity of the soul to make any perceptual activity happen, which is a big difference from the aristotelian approach of cognitive passivism. “Due to [...] ontological superiority of the soul [over body], perceptual acts cannot be understood as the result of an external object acting upon the soul.”^{17,18} Senses, in general, do not deceive us, but our mind can be confused because of its erroneous opinion and lack of understanding.¹⁹ External senses sense only the “bodily aspect” of reality, which means what merely exists. They do not perceive that “this moving thing” is alive but only color, movement, shape, sound, etc. “Being alive” is a property attributed to the sensed thing by internal sense²⁰ and for sure by reason’s inference.²¹

Internal sense

Internal sense exists and is alive, it does not understand. It senses (*sentio*) and judges (*iudico*) the state of sensory organs. It senses its own sensing of state of sensory organs and has some sort of self-awareness.

“... not only senses the things it receives from the five bodily senses, but also senses that they are sensed by it.”²²

16 See DLA 2.3.8.25–26.

17 Silva & Toivanen (2010, pp. 248–249).

18 See Silva & Toivanen (2010, pp. 248–249) for deeper discussion regarding Augustine’s possible extramissive theory. For detail see for example Silva & Toivanen (2010, p. 248) or Gannon (1956, pp. 154–180) or O’Daly (1987, pp. 80–105) or Brown (2007, pp. 153–176).

19 See Gn. litt. XII 52, Topping (2012, p. 118).

20 See DT VIII 9.

21 See DLA 2.5.11.43.

22 DLA 2.4.10.38.

Internal sense is responsible for activities which animals and humans have in common. Internal sense senses for the sake of movement, not of knowledge, which belongs to reason only. Movement is triggered for self-preservation – and its stimuli is “pursuing physical pleasures and avoiding discomforts”.²³ and this is for the sake of unity. Sense of unity appears in this soul due to the sensation of pain.²⁴ Self-preservation of life, which perceives itself as living, is based on avoiding its contrary, which is death.²⁵ Anima perceives itself as alive.²⁶

“Again, each and every thing among those that do feel the distress of pain and the allure of pleasure, by the very fact that it *does* avoid pain and pursue pleasure, confesses that it avoids its fragmentation and pursues unity.”²⁷
 “It is quite clear from this [power] how in governing and animating their bodies they pursue unity.”²⁸

Internal sense senses data it receives from sense organs, makes some sort of judgment and then decides what to do and demands bodily parts to take respective action. It judges quality and completeness of received sensory data, but does not judge by rational means! It demands missing sensory data by ordering the senses to perform respective sensing. Internal sense has a form of attention which it needs to employ to make any sense perception happen.²⁹ This means there must be a formed trinity of viewed, viewer and attention. But it does not form abstract concepts, it works only with data gained via external senses; and with the abstract category “life” and consequently “keep sensing itself as alive”.

All these actions can be automatic without some strong sense of self-awareness. All the discrimination we make about this topic, we make with our rational attention and thought. We know and distinguish the proper

²³ DLA 1.8.18.62.

²⁴ See DLA 3.23.69.234–70.238.

²⁵ See DLA 2.4.10.40.

²⁶ See DT VIII 9.

²⁷ DLA 3.23.70.238.

²⁸ DLA 3.23.69.234.

²⁹ See O’Daly (1987, pp. 92–102).

object of each sense, and the activity of internal sense; we do not do this with our internal sense, but with reason. We have no way to know whether animals have some idea about what are they doing, but we know that they lack reason, therefore they can not operate with abstract concepts.

“I recognize it, whatever it is, and I do not hesitate to name it the ‘internal sense.’ Yet unless what the bodily senses convey goes beyond it, we cannot arrive at knowledge. We hold anything that we know as something grasped by reason. But we *know* that colors cannot be sensed by hearing, nor spoken words by sight, to say nothing of the others. Although we know this, we do not know it by the eyes, nor the ears, nor by the internal sense which animals also have. Nor should we believe that they know that light is not sensed by the ears nor an utterance by the eyes, since we single these things out only by rational attention and thought.”³⁰

Relation of internal sense and reason

In humans, internal sense is an *agent* of reason,³¹ which means, that reason gets bodily data *through* internal sense only; and all bodily actions performed on the command of reason go *through* internal sense.

“[internal sense] presents and reports to reason anything with which it comes into contact. As a result, the things sensed can be singled out within their limits and grasped not only through sensing but also through knowing.”³²

Augustine asks Evodius by what we settle (*dijudico*) which sense object belongs to one sense only and which is shared among two of them.³³ Evodius says that “these matters are settled by something internal.”³⁴

³⁰ DLA 2.3.9.29–30.

³¹ See DLA 2.3.9.35.

³² DLA 2.3.9.35.

³³ See DLA 2.3.8.26.

³⁴ DLA 2.3.8.26.

Augustine adds, that it is not reason itself, because animals lack it, but it is true, that we can grasp this issue by our reason.

“I think it is by reason we grasp these things and know that they are so.”³⁵

“[By our reason] we grasp that there is an ‘internal sense’ to which the familiar five senses convey everything. [...] that by which an animal sees is one thing, whereas that by which it pursues or avoids what it senses by seeing is another. The former sense is in the eyes, the latter within the soul itself. By it, animals either pursue and take up as enjoyable, or avoid and reject as offensive, not only what they see but also what they hear or grasp by the other bodily senses.”³⁶

“[internal sense] presides over them [five bodily senses] all in common. We do grasp it with reason, as I pointed out, but I cannot call it reason itself, since it is clearly present in animals.”³⁷

Augustine distinguishes between *sensing*, which is the power of the non-rational soul, *anima*, and *knowing*, which is the power of the rational soul, *animus*. He says that our knowledge can only grasp the sensory data which this internal sense conveys to it. He says, that “we hold anything that we know as something grasped by reason. But we know that colors cannot be sensed by hearing, nor spoken words by sight, to say nothing of the others.”³⁸ But we do not know this by senses or internal sense itself; we know it by reason. And at this point he adds to make clear, that *knowing* is not performed by non-rational animals.

“Nor should we believe that they know that light is not sensed by the ears nor an utterance by the eyes, since we single these things out only by rational attention and thought.”³⁹

35 DLA 2.3.8.26.

36 DLA 2.3.8.27.

37 DLA 2.3.8.28.

38 DLA 2.3.9.29.

39 DLA 2.3.9.30.

Augustine explains the relation between reason, internal sense and sensing external objects quite clearly. He deals with question whether animals might also somehow settle the question whether they can not see colors by hearing or by their internal sense, which, after all, is life. He sets up 4 points:

“(1) the color that is sensed; (2) the sense in the eye; (3) the internal sense in the soul; (4) reason, by which each of these is defined and enumerated.”⁴⁰

He then says that animals are not able to single these points out. Reason can define them and enumerate – but reason can not do it “unless color were conveyed to it through the sense in the eyes, and this [sense] again through the internal sense that presides over it, and the selfsame internal sense through itself – at least if nothing else intervenes”.⁴¹ Here Augustine says, that reason has the capacity to operate only with data, which it actually receives from internal sense. Here he does not worry about knowing eternal and unchangeable truths, but of the bodily world only.

And because bodily sense sensing an external thing cannot sense its own sensing, Augustine makes the following distinction to figure out how reason gets the knowledge of sensing:⁴² (a) color; (b) seeing color; (c) having the sense by which color could be seen if present, even when color is not present. Eyes can only see (a), definitely not (b) and (c). But when Evodius is asked how he sees (b) and (c), he only says that he can see them when they are present, therefore he can single them out by reason only when they are actually seen.⁴³ Evodius says: “I have no idea. I know that they are, nothing more.”⁴⁴ He does not *know* how he sees (b) and (c), whether by senses, internal sense or something else. But he is quite sure he *senses* them and he is not able to describe that sensation more precisely. But he does *know* that he can define all these by reason; and

⁴⁰ DLA 2.3.9.31.

⁴¹ DLA 2.3.9.32.

⁴² See DLA 2.3.9.33.

⁴³ See DLA 2.3.9.34.

⁴⁴ DLA 2.3.9.34.

that it is only when these are actually *present for examination*.⁴⁵ This means that internal sense has some sort of independence in its functionality, which makes it a little bit unclear for being known by reason.

Then Augustine focuses more on the indescribable sensing of (b) and (c), which Evodius described with the words “I know that they are, nothing more”⁴⁶ and gets more specific. He says that “the internal sense not only senses the things it receives from the five bodily senses, but also senses *that* they are sensed by it”.⁴⁷ Animals must “sense themselves sensing”⁴⁸ otherwise they would not “pursue or avoid something”.⁴⁹ Animals do not do all this for the sake of knowledge, because they have no reason, “but only for the sake of movement – and they surely do not sense this by any of the five bodily senses”.⁵⁰ Augustin explains it using an example of an animal with closed eyes. The animal must sense it is lacking sensual information, so it opens or moves its eyes to gain the lacking visual information. When it senses that it does not see, it must also sense that it sees. This sensing is performed by internal sense.

Life senses itself as alive

Life, which senses itself sensing corporeal things, also senses itself. It must sense itself, because it avoids death, which is life’s contrary, i.e. contrary to itself.

“Now it is not clear whether this life, a life that senses [sentio] itself sensing corporeal things, senses [sentio] *itself*, unless it is for the following reason. Anyone putting the question to himself realizes that every living thing avoids death. Since death is contrary to life, life must also sense [sentio] itself, for it avoids its contrary.”⁵¹

45 See DLA 2.3.9.35.

46 DLA 2.3.9.34.

47 DLA 2.4.10.38.

48 DLA 2.4.10.38, “sensed” in original.

49 DLA 2.4.10.38.

50 DLA 2.4.10.38.

51 DLA 2.4.10.40.

Augustine does input here to infer reason: who asks himself this question, finds out this answer. He does not say that anima realizes itself sensing itself as living. Nevertheless, further DLA text says that if this is not clear, then it does not matter, and focuses on what he thinks we know for sure about this topic and what we *need* in the forthcoming interrogation:

“(a) physical objects are sensed by bodily sense; (b) the same sense cannot be sensed by the selfsame sense; (c) physical objects are sensed by the internal sense through bodily sense, as well as bodily sense itself; (d) reason acquaints us with all the foregoing, as well as with reason itself, and knowledge includes them.”⁵²

So in DLA, Augustine mentions this power of anima’s self-sensing, but does not use it in any further reasoning – but he does so in DT.⁵³ Here he uses an animal’s ability to sense itself as alive to prove something else. Before we proceed, we need to keep in mind that *knowing* (*scio*) is grasping by nothing but reason. *Reason* is one of *animus*’ faculties, rational soul (others are, for example, will and memory). There is another *knowing* (*nosco*), which Augustine uses in cases of our mind’s general knowledge (*mens* – conscious human self) which is *beyond* thinking (*cogito*). The word *sense* (*sentio*), he uses to apprehend something via senses or internal sense – here no rationality is involved, and also no formation of a mental word. Augustine asks why we love Apostle, who we never met and who is already dead. What exactly is it we love in his case?

“Return, therefore, with me, and let us consider [*considero*] why we love the Apostle. Is it on account of his human form which is most familiar to us, because we believe him to have been a man? Certainly not; otherwise, we would have no reason for loving him now, since he is no longer that man, for his soul has been separated from his body. But we believe that what we love in him lives even now, for we love his just

⁵² DLA 2.4.10.41.

⁵³ See DT VIII 9.

soul [or mind, *animus*]. And by reason of what general or special law then except this, that we know [*scio*] what a soul [*animus*] is and what a just man is. And as regards the soul [*animus*], we not unfittingly say that we, therefore, know [*nosco*] what a soul [*animus*] is because we also have a soul [*animus*]. We have never seen it with our eyes, nor formed a general or special idea of it from any similarity with other souls that we have seen, but rather, as I said, because we, too, have a soul [*animus*].

[1] For what is so intimately known [*scio*], and what knows [*sentio* (!)] itself to be itself, than that through which all other things are likewise known [*sentio*], that is, the soul [*animus*] itself? For we also recognize [*agnosco*], from a likeness to us, the movements of bodies by which we perceive [*sentio*] that others besides us live. Just as we move our body in living, so, we notice, those bodies are moved. For when a living body is moved, there is no way opened to our eyes to see the soul [*animus*], a thing which cannot be seen with the eyes. [2] But we perceive [*sentio*] something present in that bulk, such as is present in us to move our bulk in a similar way; [3] it is life and the soul [*anima*]. [4] Nor is such perception [*sentio*] something peculiar to, as it were, human prudence and reason. [5] For indeed beasts perceive [*sentio*] as living, not only themselves, but also each other [*invicem*] and one another [*alterutrum*], and us as well [*et nos ipsos*]. [6] Nor do they see [*video*] our souls [*animas*] except through the movements of our bodies, and that at once and very easily by a sort of natural agreement. [*quadam conspiratione naturali*] [7] Therefore, we know [*nosco*] the mind [*animus*] of anyone at all from our own, and from our own case we believe [*credo*] in that which we do not know [*nosco*]. [8] For not only do we perceive [*sentio*] a mind [*animus*], but we even know [*scio*] what one is, by considering our own; for we, too, have a mind [*animus*].”⁵⁴

Augustine [1] names two ways our mind can know itself: first is by reason (*scio*), which is by inferring through uttering mental words, which means thinking; the second is through sensing (*sentio*), which does not happen through the thinking process and this we somehow share with animals. Reason knows itself and internal sense senses itself – and these apprehensions contain as an inseparable part of “being alive”, for it is life itself which performs this operation, by some means. Every sensation internal sense makes, and internal sense is *anima*, also includes the sensation of “life” either “life performing the sensation” or “life as part of sensed data” as an inseparable part when appropriate sensation occurs. This interpretation is supported by [2]: when we sense an external object, bulk, moving, the inseparable part of it is that this sensed bulk is alive, since this sensed bulk is behaving the same way as this sensed life, which is „I“. If this sentence should be understood in terms of reasoning, then Augustine would use “know” – *scio*, but he did not. Therefore, animals do perceive themselves as the subject of perception and actions. But here we are not sure how self-aware they really are, perhaps not at all, let this question be open for now. In [3], he explains directly that this both external and internal “sensed moving thing...” is life and *anima*. In [4], Augustin says that this perception (sensing) is something which does not involve rationality, therefore it can take place in *anima* alone, in animals. Therefore, the fact that an animal is alive and that other animals are alive too, is somehow encoded into *anima*’s power of perception itself. *It is the only abstract concept animals can have* and perhaps also judge. Then [5] Augustine directly confirms and excludes all remaining doubts about this ability in animals. The question is, what can animals “do” with this perception (*sentio*). Augustin does not say that animals can do more than sense that they live. But [6] Augustin continues in specifying: animals can not sense souls of other beings directly (as well as humans can not), instead, this sensing of “life” is extra, “added” automatically to sensed moving bulk by some natural agreement. This addition somehow happens and we are not sure what Augustin, in his *quadam conspiratione naturali* meant. He talks in similar fashion in other places, for now we can call it “natural instinct”. In [7], Augustine closes his argument by stating that we do not know (*nosco* and *scio*) souls (*animus*)

of other humans any other way, but analogically. We know and sense our own soul (*anima* and *animus*). Our sensation (*sentio*) provides us, as it is an inseparable part, sensation, that other “clusters of moving bulks” are also alive, in the same way as we are. And this is enough to conclude that we also know (*nosco*) that other people have *animus*. We can not know the *animus* of other people, but we have good reason to believe it exists. We only sense that they are alive, but this “alive” is of one kind in all sensing beings. (Here there might be little collision with life in plants, but our sensual information in the case of plants does not provide any properties connected with life, such as movement, making sounds, etc.) The Last [8] sentence is little bit tricky, but confirms what was said. *Animus* is a higher form of *anima*. It is higher by its rationality faculties. No one ever claimed that it is higher by not having something, which is lower. So when *anima* can sense itself living, then why would not be possible for *animus* also sense itself living? But to make this fit, we have to add: *anima* and *animus* are the same life, what they differ in, are tools they have for use. *Anima* has only “life”, which is internal sense and external sensation; *animus* has extra added rationality. It also explains the beginning of [1], where *animus* senses (*sentio*) itself to be itself. The reason, which Evodius could not explain, but just replied “I have no idea [*nescio*]. I know [*scio*] that they are, nothing more”⁵⁵ is, that *animus* has extra power over *anima*, and this is rationality, which does not modify *anima*’s powers, it only relates itself to what *anima* presents to it. It relates and then analyses and thinks everything through uttering mental words. *Anima* and *animus* seem to be the very same in their ability to perceive “life”, i.e. itself. But both by different means and for a different purpose. So our mind (*mens*) knows (*nosco*) itself and can think (*scio*) about itself, in addition to sensing (*sentio*) itself. Augustin says, that rationality is eye of the mind, which means that it is a special power, not a special kind of life.

When we see another human – what can we see? We can see his bodily shape, smell, etc. but for sure we do not sense in any way his soul or justice, the only one thing left is “life” which is added by *natural agreement*.⁵⁶ The concept of “life” is not sensible because it is a spiritual thing.

⁵⁵ DLA 2.3.9.34.

⁵⁶ See DT VIII 9.

However, even animals can have this concept in their soul, concomitant with sensual data. Are there any other spiritual concepts possible in the animal soul? When we check textual evidence, we come to the conclusion that *no*. For example, justice is spiritual – how can we “see” it? In the case of justice, Augustine never uses *sentio* but *nosco* only. So it is not the province of anima as in “life”, but here he uses *nosco* – direct unmediated sight of the rational eye. He also does not use *scio* or *cogito* – thinking about it, which is of course possible, but Augustine is dealing with the question “how does the concept of justice get in our mind” and not whether we can think about it once it somehow gets into our mind. Augustine provides an explanation, that we see (*intueor*) these things with our wisdom (*sapientia*). So *sentio* is used in cases of sensing external objects and life sensing itself.

“But from what do we know [nosco] what the just person is? For we have said that we love [diligere] the Apostle for no other reason than that he is a just soul [animus]. So then we know [nosco] what a just person is, as we also know [nosco] what a soul [animus] is. But we know [nosco] what a soul [animus] is, as has been said, from ourselves, for there is a soul [animus] within us. But from what do we know [nosco] what the just person is if we are not just? For if no one knows [nosco] what the just person is except one who is himself just, then no one loves the just person except a just person. For no one can love one whom he believes [credo] to be just, merely for this reason that he believes him to be just, if he does not know what it is to be just. This follows from what we have shown above, namely, that *no one loves [diligo] what he believes and does not see [video], except by virtue of some law based on general or special knowledge [ex aliqua regula notitiae generalis sive specialis]*.”⁵⁷

⁵⁷ DT VIII 9 (italics added, K.K.).

Rationality

Reason exists, is rational, is alive and understands. Mind (*mens*) has three “modes” of knowledge, based on its ontological relation to the mind: the mind knows ontologically higher, equal (itself) and lower things.

Rationality is a tool used by life. This life is mind (*mens*). *Mens* has and uses rationality⁵⁸ and also has *anima* as its inseparable part. *Mens* has the power of wisdom (*sapientia*) and knowledge (*scientia*) through thinking (*cogito*). These are added to *anima*, which only has the power of sensing (*sentio*).

“In contemplating the highest wisdom – which is surely not the mind, for the highest wisdom is unchangeable – *the mind (animus) looks upon itself, which is changeable, and in some way enters into its own mind (mens)*. This happens only in virtue of the difference by which the mind is not what God is, and yet it is something that can please, next to God. However, it is better if it forgets itself before the love of the unchangeable God, or sets itself completely at naught in comparison with Him.”⁵⁹

Rationality and subject-object dichotomy

Rationality is part of the human soul, which is therefore rational, exists, lives and understands. It is the “head or eye of the soul”^{60, 61} and brings about personality, which can not be “turned off”; it is human “self”. As we can not “un-self” ourselves, everything we apprehend, we apprehend it *as this or through this* “self”.

⁵⁸ See DLA 2.6.13.53.

⁵⁹ DLA 3.25.76.261–2.

⁶⁰ DLA 2.6.13.53, DT XV 11.

⁶¹ It is clear that we have a body, as well as some sort of life that animates and enlivens the body. We also recognize these two features in animals. There is a third feature, something like the ‘head’ or ‘eye’ of our soul – or whatever term is more suitable for reason and intelligence – which animal nature does not have. (DLA 2.6.13.53); Even if the body is set aside and the soul alone is considered, the mind is something of it, as it were, its head, or its eye, or its countenance, but we should not think of these things as bodies. Not the soul [*anima*], therefore, but that which excels in the soul is called “mind” [*mens*]. (DT XV 11).

How does this self apprehend something? Let's look at the example of knowing an external thing – a “cup of tea”. Our sight, smell and touch provide an image of this cup of tea to internal sense. Our internal sense combines these various sensual data into a complex image and immediately triggers some motion in response, which might be the desire to drink, or to smell closer, etc. This internal sense's activity is seen by our rationality. Our rationality works through forming trinities, which result in uttering mental words through which our self, or mind, sees the content of the known thing. This process happens automatically, we can not stop our thinking, we can only change the object we grasp. This means “I do not want to think about this cup of tea and instead of it I will read this book”. This focusing on bodily sensation is also matter of habit⁶² but it does not matter here. Therefore, internal sense provides a “parent” in the form of an image of a cup of tea. Our mind focuses on it, which means it directs its will or love towards it and as result, the mental word appears in the form of “offspring”.

The image provided by internal sense, and the image created by thinking are basically the same, apart from the stronger emphasis on immateriality in the latter. So why would Augustin implement this approach? He needed to formulate trinities as possible images of God's Trinity, but there is one more implication of such an approach. The image provided by internal sense is “that which is seen” and the image (or word) formed from it by thinking is “that through which it is seen” – and here suddenly appears a subject-object distinction in pure sense. Here, of course, appears “the one who sees it” and who is distinct – which is mind (*mens*). This is why Augustin says that mind (*mens*) *has* and *uses* reason and rationality as such.⁶³

This mind, which sees all the processes in humans, is the same as the “mind” which “sees” in animals which lack reason – and it is called life in both cases. But in animals, this life does not have a “rationality tool” to create a mental word through which it could gain “detachment” from the known object. This means there is no “tool” to create “self”, which perceives itself as distinct from things known. In this case we should not talk about “knowing” but “sensing” only.

62 See Strozynski (2013, p. 292).

63 See DLA 2.6.13.53.

God and His image in rationality

God can know and sense, but has no body, instead God is the same as His powers – eternal, immortal, incorruptible, unchangeable, living, wise, powerful, beautiful, just, good, blessed, and spirit,⁶⁴ these powers are not God's but they *are* God. God can perform all the operations as creatures can, but God performs them directly as part of His essence. But it is not so in humans and animals. Life in creatures is so called “bound” to smaller operational units. These units, because they have “boundaries”, are limited and therefore have parts, and can compose a greater whole. This is why Augustine says that in humans, these powers are a *human's*, not a human himself. Whereas in God's case, they are God Himself, so created life is fragmented.

Self-knowing and Self-thinking

There are two apprehensions to mental content in the rational soul. Direct (*nosco*) and through thinking (*scio, cogito*). The direct one is evident self-awareness of anything the mind does and Augustine relates it to God, who is the supreme trinity consisting of “*wisdom (sapientia), the knowledge (notitia) of itself, and the love (dilectio) of itself*”⁶⁵ and because we are images of God, then this trinity is also present in us – in some imperfect way. This direct self-knowledge is sort of subjective knowledge, which, in spite of it's subjectivity, provides objective knowledge which can not be doubted by any skepticism.⁶⁶ There is a strong tendency in philosophy after Augustine to reduce or externalize this inner space of the mind, which is the image of God, non-reducible, independent of the external world, experiences and reasoning.⁶⁷

“For so do we find a trinity in man, that is, the mind [mens], and the knowledge [notitia] by which it knows [nosco] itself, and the love [dilectio] by which it loves itself.”⁶⁸

64 See DT XV 8.

65 DT XV 10.

66 See Matthews (1977, p. 25), Cary (2000, pp. 55, 63–73).

67 See Remes (2008, p. 157, 2007, pp. 69–73).

68 DT XV 10.

“mind [mens] in man and of its knowledge [notitia] and love [dilectio]”⁶⁹

However, this *notitia* in humans takes place only in relation to itself and higher things. It knows itself as the knower. It knows itself knowing. It knows itself as the subject of all mental and bodily activities, this *notitia* is beyond the thinking process.

Everything else the mind does with the tool it has at its disposal – this tool is thinking (*cogitatio*). Thinking is grasping something through uttering a mental word. This thinking process provides a subject-object approach, so there is someone (*mens*), who apprehends something (bodily image, eternal truth, itself) through thinking.

“memory [memoria], understanding [intellegentia], and will [voluntas], we [mens] remember [memini] nothing of the mind [mens] except through the memory [memoria], nor understand [intellego] except through the understanding [intellegentia], nor love [amo] except through the will [voluntas].”⁷⁰

Self-knowing (*nosco*) of the rational mind and self-sensing (*sentio*) of non-rational anima seems to be essentially the same. It is a sort of permanent readiness to perceive all the processes occurring in the space of the soul. The only difference seems to be in “what it is looking at”. The mind in the rational soul looks at the unceasing thinking process and therefore has tool to perceive itself as distinct from things it knows and are not itself. This thinking process provides “the gap” of subject-object perspective. Whereas non-rational “mind” in animals only directly “sees” images of external objects, which means it has no tools to discriminate itself from these objects on basis of conscious self-knowledge. This animal soul has imputed (by some sort of natural agreement or inclination) notion of “being alive” – regarding to itself, other animals and humans.⁷¹ And this no-

69 DT XV 12.

70 DT XV 12.

71 See DT VIII 9.

tion of “being alive” must be attributed to human mind (*mens*) too. This suggests that life is only of one kind, and the difference is made only by “tools” it has for disposal.

Self-apprehending in children

Life is present in all its parts as a whole, which means that once anima is equipped by rationality, it cannot not-use it. The exception is in children who are not yet fully grown and thus in an unfortunate condition because they have not developed their reason yet. Augustine talks about ignorance of things and darkness of an infant’s mind, children are attracted by bodily pleasures and are not able to commit sins.⁷²

“[Children] have no thought [cogito] of their inner self [sua vero interiora non cogitent], nor can they be admonished to do so [...] that it is one thing not to know [nosco] oneself, and another thing not to think [cogito] of oneself.”⁷³

Children cannot think (*cogito*) about themselves, because their rationality is not yet fully developed, but can know (*nosco*) themselves, because they have a mind, *mens*. He repeats this argument also when discussing adult humans, so this twofold self-approach remains in adults too.⁷⁴

“Are we also to believe that it [child] *knows* [nosco] *itself*, but is too intent on those things through which it begins to experience [sentio] pleasure through the senses of the body, a pleasure that is so much the greater the more unfamiliar it is? That *it cannot be ignorant of itself, yet it cannot think* [cogito] *of itself* [non ignorare se potest, sed cogitare se non potest]?”⁷⁵

⁷² Children are broadly discussed also in DLA 3.23.66–69.

⁷³ DT XIV 7.

⁷⁴ DT X 7.

⁷⁵ DT XIV 7.

A child is not able to think of itself (*cogito*), which means to look with inner sight of mind at itself and to produce a mental word of itself, but is clearly able to know (*nosco*) itself. Here we can see that rationality is just a “feature” of human life which needs to be developed first; children, who have not grown up enough to understand are not fully humans. Yet, as the recently planted tree gives fruits after many years, we do not call it fruitless.⁷⁶

Intentionality

Rationality has one special feature, which even children do not fully have, or are not able to use: *intentionality* – a sort of distance between an image and the one who perceives it. This distance is made available by the capacity of uttering mental words.

“And because they are bodies which it has loved outside of itself through the senses of the body, and with which it has become entangled by a kind of daily familiarity, it cannot bring them into itself as though into a country of incorporeal nature, and, therefore, it fastens together their images, which it has made out of itself, and forces them into itself. For in forming them it gives them something of its own essence, *but it also keeps something by which it may freely judge the form of these images*; this is what is called more precisely the mind [magis mens], namely, the rational understanding [rationalis intellegentia], which is kept in order to pass judgment [quae servatur ut iudicet]. For we perceive [sentio] that we have, in common with the beasts, those parts of the soul [animae partes] that are informed by the images of bodies.”⁷⁷

Augustine’s idea of distance needed to judge is very close to intentionality. How can we judge something? There must be something to be judged, someone to judge and some measure, according which it can be judged,

⁷⁶ See DLA 3.22.65.224.

⁷⁷ DT X 7 (italics added, K.K.).

something to be compared with. Internal sense judges sensory data and the senses' activity in some unconscious or un-reflected way. There is also the question whether the children's inability to judge means they make judgements in the same way as animals do – without rationality by means of internal sense only. Augustine is not very clear here, but when we check the latin he is using, then it sheds some light.

When talking about children, he says they know (*nosco*) themselves, which is only possible with the mind (*mens*); he never uses sense (*sentio*) in this case. Therefore even children, in spite of not having their rationality fully developed, can have some primitive use of it, which makes them persons (*persona*) in some way. Therefore children know (*nosco*) and sense (*sentio*) themselves, but do not know (*scio*) through thinking (*cogitare*) themselves. Therefore, children know themselves directly, but not through thinking.

Self-knowing in children happens in spite of the fact that they are not yet able to think about themselves. So the rational eye of a child's mind can not function properly. A child is in some way aware of itself and it could be understood in terms of animal's self-awareness. In both cases, no thinking is involved. An animal senses and judges based on numbers. The same stands for children, but in their case the rational eye is added, which is mostly blind, yet through which it can see (*nosco*) itself. And yet, Augustine says, that children are in an unfortunate condition and should grow up first to be fully human. The not yet fully functioning thinking process does not provide the subject-object paradigm. This could lead us to conclude that self-sensing (*sentio*) in the case of anima and self-seeing (*nosco*) in the case of animus are very close to each other, perhaps the same? The only difference is, that children will grow up and start using their rationality or thinking, whereas animals will not. Therefore there is some basic self-perception in the soul, where rationality is not involved. So the main difference-maker is thinking, uttering mental words.

At a certain age, children start using language. Language consists of joining together sensory information (sound) with an image (mental word) When we stick to the interpretation that life is only one and there are some features or tools to use, then before children start to use rationality, they are on a par with animals – all their life concentrates

on internal sense and external senses. Animals do not have rationality, therefore they can not form mental words, which form abstract concepts, which means that animals cannot have any form of intentionality. Except one: they have one abstract concept made available, and this is “being alive”⁷⁸. This allows them to be somewhat intentional – they can establish relation between themselves and other living beings. The other living being is not some moving coloured shape producing some noise and smell, but it is another living being. This abstract concept also makes any form of judgment regarding self-preservation possible, which of course needs pleasure and pain information as part of this judgement too.

This notion of intentionality is also present in Aristotle’s approach to self.⁷⁹ Aristotle claims as an obvious fact that a human being has always some notion of itself as the subject of its own activities. But in Aristotle’s case it happens through some “reflexivity” attached to its own acts.⁸⁰

Sin and animals

Animals are not able to commit sin. They have no rationality. Their judgments based on natural inclinations and habits is not sufficient. Animals are not responsible for their activities in a similar way as we are not responsible for our activities in an unconscious dream. Humans, however, think and have free will, which makes sinning possible. One of the necessary conditions to sin is that the human must be aware of the situation at the moment he makes the decision – not after it. Therefore in case of humans, there must be some judge, who is permanently watching. And this is the mind (*mens*). This judge uses knowing (*scio*) through thinking (*cogito*); and this judge has to watch and decide what to do. There is will, or love, which is a natural property of every living soul and this love unceasingly triggers mental and bodily movement. This love joins the eye of the mind with some content, coming either from bodily world or from the space of mind or from memory to produce a mental word. We cannot

78 DT VIII 9.

79 See EN III 1, 1111a3–7.

80 See Sihvola (2008, p. 126).

decide to stop thinking and every thinking operation involves love as its trinity member.

Later scholastics used the term *conscientia*, which has a moral connotation. The mind cannot judge situations in some form of after-coming or second-order act, because this would mean that the mind is not really responsible for its activity. For the same reason, we must exclude some concomitant second-order acts, because the mind would only be a viewer without direct influence. The mind must be in some way a self-aware *agent*. Therefore the love, which is part of every trinity Augustin identifies, must in some way be joined to the mind as such.

In humans, there must be some form of permanent self-awareness of itself as the agent or subject of all activities, which is distinct and has full control to judge over all motions, both mentally and bodily. Therefore, love in the case of humans is in some way altered by rationality – altered compared to love in animals. Animals seek pleasures and avoid discomfort and pain, but their love is just a non-conscious source of motion, and its functionality was programed by the Creator through numbers, instincts, etc. In animals, love contains only one “extra” dimension, and this is love for itself as living being. In both cases – humans and animals, love triggers motion for the sake of some end – and this end is unity.

Source of motion in living beings

Order of justice and order of things

Augustine sets two different orders of creation: The order of justice and order of changeable things. In the order of justice, the ultimate goal is to love and to will the right things in the right way and thus to reach an unchangeable greater good (God) – it knows and obeys; in order of things, all motion is set according to the “laws that were laid down for the flourishing of every part of the universe”.⁸¹ And internal sense belongs here too. Therefore it does not need to have self-awareness in strong sense, it just obeys laws imputed to it by the Creator for the sake of self-preservation.

81 DLA 3.14.40.139.

Wisdom and numbers

Everything created has its own form, which is proper to its *genus*. Form and Genus are set by wisdom and numbers. The whole world is built up in hierarchical order. Augustine gives an example of fire:⁸² that which is closer to fire is both heated and illuminated, that which is far away is illuminated only. God is fire and rational souls are close enough to be heated, heat provides rationality.⁸³ Animals are too far to be heated, they are illuminated only. The same stands for plants and bodily things. Absolutely distant – where neither heat nor light reach is “nothing”. Numbers are derived from wisdom,⁸⁴ but “they are one and the same thing”⁸⁵.

Everything was created with some intrinsic rules, what it should be like according to its purpose. The only thing which can make choices, and therefore act on it’s own, is a rational soul, an animus. Anima is not rational. Therefore, according to this view it cannot learn by itself.

“Likewise, the power of understanding that is present in wisdom warms those close to it, such as rational souls, whereas things that are farther away, such as physical objects, are not affected by the heat of wisdom but are [merely] suffused with the light of numbers.”⁸⁶

“just there are true and unchangeable rules of numbers, whose intelligible structure and truth you declared to be unchangeably present in common to all who recognize them, so too are there true and unchangeable rules of wisdom. [...] they are true and evident.”⁸⁷

“Everything in which you see number and measure and order.”⁸⁸

“They have forms, because they have numbers.”⁸⁹

82 See DLA 2.11.

83 See DLA 2.11.31.125.

84 See DLA 2.11.30.120.

85 DLA 2.11.31.123.

86 DLA 2.11.32.128.

87 DLA 2.10.29.119.

88 DLA 2.20.54.203.

89 DLA 2.16.42.164.

“He [God] gave numbers to all things, even to the lowliest placed at the very end. All physical objects have their own numbers even though they are the last among things. However, He did not give wisdom to physical objects, nor even to all souls, but only to rational souls – as if He had established in them a home for [wisdom], in accordance with which He puts all things in order, even the lowliest to which He gave numbers.”⁹⁰

“Therefore, if either with bodily sense or with the mind’s consideration you cannot get hold of whatever changeable thing you are looking upon, unless you grasp some form of numbers (without which it would lapse back into nothing), do not doubt that there is some eternal and unchangeable form [forma]. As a result, these changeable things are not interrupted but instead run their courses through time, with measured movements and a distinct variety of forms, like poetic verses. This eternal and unchangeable form is not contained in and spread out through space; nor is it extended and varied in time. But through it, all [changeable] things are able to be given form, as well as to fulfil and carry out the numbers pertinent to the times and places appropriate to their kind.”⁹¹

“Yet *no thing can give form to itself*, for the following reason. No thing can give what it does not have, and surely something is given form in order to have form. Accordingly, if any given thing has some form, there is no need for it to receive what it [already] has. But if something does not have a form, it cannot receive from itself what it does not have. Therefore, no thing can give form to itself, as we said. Now what more is there for us to say about the changeability of the body and the mind? Enough was said previously. Thus it follows that mind and body are given form by an unchangeable form that endures forever.”⁹²

90 DLA 2.11.31.125.

91 DLA 2.16.44.171.

92 DLA 2.17.45.172–173.

One source of motion is wisdom, another is numbers. Humans have rationality through wisdom, everything else (animals, plants, bodies) has only numbers. Wisdom moves its bearers toward unity, consisting of justice by means of free choice; numbers move its bearers toward bodily unity and integrity by necessity. Internal sense has numbers only. Augustine emphasizes that no matter how much mind is nested in images of corporeal things, it never becomes “subject to the laws governing corporeal parts and wholes”.⁹³

Unity (intellectual – justice; bodily – integrity, pleasure and pain)

All the motion of the created world is directed toward some end – toward unity. Bodies and animals are directed toward unity of physical bodies through physical motion and sensation; rational animals toward unity of their soul through knowledge and willing. Will can be attracted only by that which was known, which means by something. By our free will we perform motion towards God’s wisdom and bliss, or man’s foolishness and sin.⁹⁴

“And in the case of the rational mind, the entire pursuit of knowledge, which delights its nature, traces everything it perceives back to unity, and in error it avoids only being confounded by incomprehensible ambiguity. On what grounds is any ambiguity a problem except because it has no definite unity? From this fact, it is apparent that all things, either when they inflict harm or suffer it, or when they are pleasing or are pleased, suggest and proclaim the unity of the Creator.”⁹⁵

An animal must be aware of the state of its sense organs and also its bodily integrity or unity as a whole, which is signaled at least by the absence of pain. An animal must be aware enough to perform correct movement.

93 Cory (2012, p. 363).

94 See DLA 3.24.73–74.

95 DLA 3.23.70.238–239.

Performing movement is based on some kind of non-rational judgment, which internal sense does. Unity in animals is sought because of bodily integrity, pleasure and pain.

“The soul confronts the physical suffering that threatens to destroy its unity and integrity not with pleasure [libenter] or indifference [indifferenter], but instead with reluctance [reluctanter] and resistance [renitenter].”⁹⁶

“...every action in an animal’s life is pursuing physical pleasures and avoiding discomforts.”⁹⁷

Internal sense can pursue unity without being self-aware in strong sense. It can just follow the program imputed in it by numbers. It only senses itself as being alive and this sensation triggers correct behaviour based on sensual information. Sometimes the animal needs to choose between two kinds of pain, then it chooses according the ultimate view, which is “to keep itself sensing itself as alive” by means of unity.

Happiness

Every being wants to be happy and avoid discomfort, which is encoded by wisdom and numbers. Humans know for the sake of happiness, which is brought about by unity. Gaining happiness consists of voluntary turning to higher goods, which is God. The practical impact of this choice is life according cardinal virtues: justice, which consists of prudence, bravery, moderateness. Cardinal virtues, in general, mean knowing the true unchangeable “idea” of all and suppressing all that might distract us from this. Some of these distractive impulses are coming from the non-rational part of our mind – and we need to tame it, just as animals are tamed. Animals sense for the sake of movement – they avoid fragmentation of their body’s unity, which is triggered by pain.

⁹⁶ DLA 3.23.69.235.

⁹⁷ DLA 1.8.18.62.

Love

Love is a member of *every* trinity Augustine describes. We always love; we always love something. As long as we live, we love. Love is the principle triggering motion and “this power of self-motion is, qua potentiality, God given”.⁹⁸

The subtlest motion is psychological or spiritual, and this subtle motion triggers a physical motion. Therefore, where there is life, there is love, where there is love, there is motion. Love is the principle pervading each activity of every part of life.

Therefore, when Augustine says that animals have some sense for maintaining their bodies’ unity, it is by love. Love is the part of the trinities which occur in animals too. One trinity in animals involves sensing external things and the other recalling these things from memory to internal sense.

“In the meantime I have now shown, [...] that the will as the unifier of the visible object and the vision, as it were, of the parent and the offspring, whether it be in perceiving [sentiendo] or in thinking [cogitando], cannot be called the parent or the offspring.”⁹⁹

“Even beasts can perceive corporeal things outwardly through the senses of the body, can recall [reminisci] them when they are fixed in the memory, can seek for what is beneficial in them, and flee from what is unpleasant.”¹⁰⁰

The internal sense in animals can judge what is missing, what is desirable or to be avoided for the sake of the goal of self-preservation. Will, or love, which unites the other two elements in the trinity is “nothing other than the will seeking for or holding on to the enjoyment of something”.¹⁰¹

It is not easy to explain the relation between “life”, “love” and “knowledge” according to Augustine, until we realize that animus is ani-

98 O’Daly (1987, p. 20).

99 DT XI 18.

100 DT XII 2.

101 DT XIV 8.

ma+reason. Anima has the capacity to sense itself as alive and has some vigor¹⁰² to keep itself alive. To keep itself alive involves two things: interaction between “what is anima’s” (intramental) and “the rest” (extramental). The second element is motivation – the love or “the wanting to”. This principle is to be found both in anima and animus. To perform the skill of sensing life uses tools it has at its disposal – sense organs, internal sense, memory, and in humans’ case, also reason. But there is no “tool” to perform love. I think it is because life itself is love. Life unites knowledge with the knower, and based on this conjunction, it triggers motion, mentally and bodily.

The main difference between love in animals and humans is in self-awareness. It is like in a dream – in the dream we want to do something to escape danger or to get somewhere. When the dream is not lucid, this love, which triggers motion, is not reflected. We are that love, we have no control of it, we do not realize what is going on and therefore we have no choice but to follow it “blindly”. This is how it is for animals. Humans, however, can mediate between “known things” and “life” via thinking. This allows them to establish a subject-object paradigm and be conscious of a subject, deliberately choosing between multiple options. When in an unconscious dream, something starts chasing me and I run as quickly as possible with no choice. When I want to get to some distant place, I walk for hours and days and perhaps never reach this place. But when I “wake up” and the dream becomes lucid, I am aware of the situation and in the first case, I can fly upwards to escape danger, for example. In the second case, I can go by car, airplane or fly myself to get there quickly. The point is that I gain some sort of “detachment” from the situation and suddenly I can start to deliberately consider options I have to reach the desired goal.

Non-rational motion in rational animals

There is motion in rational souls, which should not be followed, but rather subordinated to the greater good – if it is not, it is sinful movement. This motion is also caused by “features that seem not to occur among

102 See DT XII 1.

animals but are not the highest attributes in human beings”¹⁰³ and also trigger an inclination or aversion based on pleasure and pain. These are “joking, laughing, love of praise and of glory, and the drive to dominate”¹⁰⁴ and shall be dominated by reason, manifested by cardinal virtues.

Reason and utility

Another perspective of looking at the source of motion focuses on the difference between body and spirit – they co-exist but are also antagonistic in their goals.

“Nor should it be a surprise that we do not have free choice of the will to elect what we do rightly, due to ignorance; or we see what ought to be done rightly and will it, but we cannot accomplish it due to the resistance of carnal habits, which the vehemence of our mortal inheritance has somehow naturally grown into.”¹⁰⁵

So there are two motions: of non-rational (numbers) and rational (wisdom) soul. When our mind does not follow eternal truths, then it is overwhelmed by lower impulses, which are connected with the body and with that, which we can lose against our will, then we will be punished.

“Someone loses what he was unwilling to use well, although he could have used it well without trouble had he been willing. That is, anyone who knowingly does not act rightly thereby loses the knowledge of what is right; and anyone who was unwilling to act rightly when he could thereby loses the ability when he is willing. For there really are two penalties for each sinful soul: ignorance and trouble. Through ignorance the soul is dishonored by error; through trouble it is afflicted with torments.”¹⁰⁶

103 DLA 1.8.18.63.

104 DLA 1.8.18.63.

105 DLA 3.18.52.177.

106 DLA 3.18.52.178.

“But to approve falsehoods as truths so that one errs against one’s will, and to not be able to hold oneself back from lustful actions due to the relentless and tortuous affliction of carnal bondage, is *not* human nature as originally established, but the penalty after being damned. When we speak of free will to act rightly, obviously we are speaking of it as human beings were originally made.”¹⁰⁷

This antagonism involves internal sense as far as it provides a reason for its own goals and its own motion, which reason can follow. Internal sense does not need to be self-aware to do so. Augustine talks about *usus* or utility, which we could also translate as experience, comfortable experience. Therefore, internal sense makes its decisions, no matter how unconscious, based on *carnal habits*,¹⁰⁸ experiences of *utility*¹⁰⁹ and species-based instincts.

“Reason and utility evaluate matters differently. Reason performs its evaluations in light of the truth, so that it may subordinate lesser to greater things by right judgment. Utility, however, is generally inclined by being accustomed to convenience, with the result that it evaluates more highly things that truth shows to be the lesser.”¹¹⁰

Learning in animals

Augustine talks about rational humans, who, because of their rationality, dominate animals, so they can tame them and make them serve. So there is some possibility of shaping the behaviour of animals. But again, this is done by means of pleasure and pain and repetition. It is not sure, whether an animal would change its behaviour by itself.

107 DLA 3.18.52.179.

108 See DLA 3.18.52.177.

109 See DLA 3.5.17.61.

110 DLA 3.5.17.61.

“... its spirit is so subjugated that it is enslaved to human will by habit and inclination.”¹¹¹

There is one interesting idea in Augustine regarding animal “learning”. Inclination, or passion of anima is shaped in offspring state when the animal is in its mother’s womb. The sensations and passions which its mother senses are somehow imprinted on offspring’s bodies and souls, so when they are born, they just follow these innate imprints. Augustine also talks about the mother’s fantasies, which are images it sensed from an external word with passion. He gives an example of Jacob and the speckled goats. But still, there is no free space for learning or free will as such, nor self-awareness in a strong sense.

“The will [voluntas] possesses such power in uniting these two that it moves the sense to be formed to that thing which is seen, and keeps it fixed on it when it has been formed. And if it is so violent that it can be *called* love [amor], or desire [cupiditas], or passion [libido], it likewise exerts a powerful influence on the rest of the body of this living being. And where a duller and harder matter does not offer resistance, it changes it into a similar form and color. Note how easily the little body of the chameleon turns very easily into the colors that it sees. *In other animals, whose bodily bulk does not lend itself so easily to such changes, the offspring usually show some traces of the passionate desires of their mothers, whatever it was that they gazed upon with great delight. For the more tender, and so to speak, the more formable the original seeds were, the more effectually and the more capably do they follow the inclination of their mothers’ soul [anima], and the phantasy [phantasia] that arose in it through the body upon which it looked with passion. There are numerous examples of this that could be mentioned, but one from the most trustworthy books will suffice: in order that the sheep and the she-goats might give birth to speckled off-*

111 DLA 1.7.16.54.

spring, Jacob had rods of various colors placed before them in the watering-troughs, to look at as they drank, during that period when they had conceived [cf. Genesis 30:37, 41].”¹¹²

Possible approaches to self-awareness via internal sense

After discussing all the relevant aspects of Augustine’s approach to internal sense and anima’s self-sensing, we can proceed to evaluate whether and how internal sense:

1. Senses the state of sense organs, corporeal things and sense organs’ activity.
2. Judges the state of sense organs, i.e. corporeal things.
3. Senses itself sensing state of sense organs, i.e. corporeal things.
4. Judges itself sensing state of sense organs, corporeal things and the sense organs’ activity.
5. Senses itself.
6. Perceives anything else apart from the state of sense organs and itself.

Sense state of sense organs, corporeal things and activity of sense organs

Yes, this is evident.

Judge the state of sense organs, i.e. corporeal things

Internal sense judges the quality and completeness of received sensory data, either directly or from sense memory, but does not judge by rational means! It does not form abstract concepts; not forming abstract term means that it functions on the basis of raw sensory data + basic “instincts” which force internal sense to execute appropriate movement in response to sensory data. It composes and decomposes sensory data.

112 DT XI 5.

“Just as the internal sense judges what is missing or what is enough for the sense in the eyes...”¹¹³

Let’s use an example of a sleeping wolf who smells a hare – the prey. The sense of smell provides smell information to internal sense. The internal sense evaluates or “judges” the state of the sensory organs and – based on multiple previous experiences – infers, that this smell is always attached with certain visual information (the shape of hare). It commands closed eyes to open and look for that shape. The hare is also connected with hearing experience (mastication, footsteps, whistling), so it starts turning ears to find the missing sound. Its eyes and ears confirm the hare’s presence, gained by smell. Then internal sense starts physical motion – hunting.

It is clear that internal sense must judge the state of the sense organs in order to fulfil its purpose – to keep the animal alive. To do so, it must judge what is good, bad and missing in sensory data, and demand the appropriate bodily response. Animals also have and use sense memory.

“Even beasts can perceive corporeal things outwardly through the senses of the body, can recall [reminisci] them when they are fixed in the memory, can seek for what is beneficial in them, and flee from what is unpleasant.”¹¹⁴

Sense itself sensing state of sense organs, i.e. corporeal things

Internal sense senses itself sensing the state of sense organs, i.e. corporeal things.

“The internal sense not only senses the things it receives from the five bodily senses, but also senses *that* they are sensed by it. Animals would not move themselves to either pursue or avoid something unless they sensed themselves sensing...”¹¹⁵

113 DLA 2.5.12.49.

114 DT XII 2.

115 DLA 2.4.10.38.

There are some images, sounds, tastes, smells and touches which are received by internal sense which it combines to compound some “meaningful structure” from them. This meaningful structure is then evaluated, we can say judged, by it and then the internal sense initiates some response, which is, in our case, an order to execute some physical movement (it includes focusing of sense organs on the intended target). So there is life or anima, which senses this activity of itself. This life has one special power – can sense itself as alive, and not only itself, but other animals and humans too. So it has some sense of unity, because it must set boundaries around each living individual, including itself. And this axiom of self-perceiving life is the key. If we grasp internal sense as some unconscious faculty, which senses the state of the sense organs and then, by some instinct or habits and inclinations, triggers the appropriate motion, then we have a problem explaining Augustine’s statement “animals would not move themselves to either pursue or avoid something unless they sensed themselves sensing...”¹¹⁶ However, when we consider internal sense with Augustine’s axiom that life senses itself, then it is very easy to explain this statement. Life is a non-primitive quality, and has the capacity to preserve itself. To be able to do so, it must somehow sense what this “itself” is, i.e. what should it preserve and that death is the opposite. In addition, there are plants, animals and rational animals, and each of them provide some “tools” to this life, how to sense itself and how to preserve itself.

Internal sense must be aware of the situation, which occurs, but does not necessarily need to be aware of itself as a distinct subject performing operations. Let us once again look at the dream example: We can have a dream where we perceive a situation around us and perceive ourselves reacting to that situation, but we are not aware that we are dreaming and have no sort of “detachment” from it. At the moment we realize we are dreaming, we start to perceive ourselves as distinct from the dream situation and the dream becomes lucid. This “waking up” from the dream is something bound to rationality, which animals do not have.

There is no textual evidence justifying any stronger reading of internal sense’s self-awareness.

116 DLA 2.4.10.38.

Judge itself sensing state of sense organs, corporeal things and activity of sense organs

Augustine claims that judgment is possible for one faculty in relation to something lower than itself. What judges is higher than what is being judged. The only exception is reason, which can judge itself's activity. Internal sense judges the state of the sense organs and data it receives from them. This is based on long-term experience and innate instincts, but it can in no way judge itself, because there is no detachment to do so. This detachment is provided by rationality and its thinking.

But there is one exception: the self-preservation principle, which consists of avoiding death as it's own contrary. Anima senses that it is alive and wants to keep itself alive to maintain this sensation. This perception starts motion via an inclination or aversion in relation to bodily integrity and its fragmentation, so this self-sensing principle is the primary source of motion in animals.

Therefore, *if* internal sense can judge itself sensing, then it can only do so with respect to one single goal: to keep itself alive. It can not judge itself in respect to anything else like “good”, “moral good”, “justice” or “eternal truth”, since it has no power to see or create these concepts. If internal sense could grasp such concepts, it would make it immortal.¹¹⁷

Sense itself

“Now it is not clear whether this life, a life that senses itself sensing corporeal things, senses itself, unless it is for the following reason. Anyone putting the question to himself realizes that *every living thing avoids death. Since death is contrary to life, life must also sense itself, for it avoids its contrary.*”¹¹⁸

Augustin asks whether internal sense, which senses itself sensing corporeal things (which is confirmation of statement 3.) also senses itself. There is no textual evidence for the presence of a special sense organ for

¹¹⁷ See Cary (2000, pp. 95–102).

¹¹⁸ DLA 2.4.10.40 (italics added, K.K.).

such a sensation, therefore, there must be a kind of reflexivity principle present in the case of anima – it senses itself as alive.¹¹⁹ How, however, could life have a notion of its own death and not to have a notion of its own life? Without DT VIII 9 we could say it does not need to, it just avoids death because of numbers.

Here someone might oppose Augustine with another statement of his: “every action in an animal’s life pursues physical pleasures and avoids discomforts”¹²⁰ with the claim that the animal itself does not need to have any self-sensing except to sense the state of the sense organs, and the rest is an experience-and-number-based system of motions to avoid pain or pursue physical pleasure. Animals pursue unity, and this is somehow encoded in them with numbers.

“Now the pain that beasts feel reveals a *certain wondrous power in their souls, praiseworthy of its kind. It is quite clear from this [power] how in governing and animating their bodies they pursue unity.* What else is pain but a sense of division and intolerance of corruption? Accordingly, it is as plain as day how eager and dogged the soul is in pursuing unity throughout the whole of its body. The soul confronts the physical suffering that threatens to destroy its unity and integrity *not with pleasure or indifference, but instead with reluctance and resistance. It would not be apparent, then, how great the drive for unity is in the lower animals of the Creation, if not for the pain of beasts.* And if it were not apparent, we would be less aware than we need to be that they were all fashioned by the supreme and sublime and inexpressible unity of their Creator.”¹²¹

I think the explanation of avoiding pain is not sufficient, because animals do not jump from a high cliff which would kill them instantly – they do not want to die and there is not actually any pain present in jumping off the cliff. There is also the axiom of life’s self-sensing.

119 See DT VIII 9.

120 DLA 1.8.18.62.

121 DLA 3.23.69.234–236 (italics added, K.K.).

Augustin compares the nature of motion in bodies and animals. He talks about unity designed by the Creator, and neither bodies nor animals have the power to disobey it:

“Every thing among those that feel neither pain nor pleasure [stones, for example] acquires loveliness of its kind, or at least a sort of stability for its nature, from some unity. Again, each and every thing among those that do feel the distress of pain and the allure of pleasure [animals], by the very fact that it *does* avoid pain and pursue pleasure, confesses that it avoids its fragmentation and pursues unity.”¹²²

Therefore, life has a sense of unity. Internal sense would not be able to evaluate incoming sensual data correctly if it did not have any relevant measure according to which they should be evaluated. What is more and less important in what situation? Internal sense must have a measure, according to which it evaluates incoming sensual data. It is certain there is a wondrous power in their souls. Internal sense, which represents anima in animals, can sense itself, but not as a distinct object, which it can grasp in way. Rationality can grasp itself through mental word. It grasps itself through the idea of “alive”, which is innate to it. It does not do this through the subject/object paradigm, and because anima is life, it senses itself as alive, ergo it senses (*sentio*) itself.

Perceive anything else than state of sense organs and itself

No, because anima has no tools to do so. To be able to do so, it needs to have a rational eye added to it or to become God.

Conclusion

Animals can not perceive themselves as the subject of their activities. All activities in animals – both bodily and animal – are triggered by programs encoded in them by the Creator or by their pregnant mothers or

¹²² DLA 3.23.70.238.

by humans, who tame them. But an animal's motivation as such is lacking, animals sense for the sake of movement – they avoid their bodily fragmentation, or from another perspective, maintain their bodies' unity, on account of pain and an aversion to it. To this simple approach Augustin adds one extra feature, which is animals' ability to perceive one abstract or spiritual category of "being alive" to the sensed data. This is not part of the information received by the internal sense from the external senses. This ability, based on instinct, might confuse some of Augustine's readers to come to the conclusion that animals might be aware of themselves as the subject of their activities. As it turns out, this ability is provided by rationality only. Rationality operates on the basis of uttering mental words, which provides subject/object detachment of the mind's view and the image viewed.

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Abstrakt

Svatý Augustin a sebepoznání u zvířat

Tato studie se zaměřuje na Augustinovo pojetí sebe-poznání, respektive sebe-vnímání u zvířat zkoumáním vztahu vnějších smyslů, vnitřního smyslu a rozumu. Zaměří se zejména na vysvětlení toho, co spouští pohyb ve zvířatech – proč se hýbou, vnímají a žijí. Součástí takovéto motivace je i pud sebezáchovy, který je interpretačním oříškem společně se schopností zvířat vnímat sebe, ostatní zvířata a lidi jako živé bytosti – a to i přesto, že intence „být živý“ není součástí smyslové zkušenosti.

Klíčová slova: Augustin, sebe-poznání, sebe-vnímání, vnitřní smysl, rozum, moudrost a čísla

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